A subfield lattice attack on overstretched NTRU assumptions
Martin R. Albrecht; Shi Bai; Léo Ducas
-Information Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, UK; ENS de Lyon, Laboratoire LIP, France; Cryptology Group, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
注：跟HE的YASHE，NTRU-based方案相关，涉及到底层安全性
Three’s Compromised Too: Circular Insecurity for Any Cycle Length from (Ring-)LWE
Navid Alamati; Chris Peikert
- University of Michigan, USA; University of Michigan, USA
注：涉及到bootstrapping的安全性
Efficiently Computing Data-Independent Memory-Hard Functions
Joel Alwen; Jeremiah Blocki
- IST, Austria; Microsoft Research/Purdue, USA
注：涉及到bitcoin的proof-of-work函数吧
Message Transmission with Reverse Firewalls – Secure Communication on Corrupted Machines
Yevgeniy Dodis; Ilya Mironov; Noah Stephens-Davidowitz
- New York University; Google; New York University
注：不错，一个很有意思的scenario
The Multi-User Security of Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3
Mihir Bellare; Björn Tackmann
- UC San Diego; UC San Diego
注：涉及到AES的mode，可以看看
Programmable Hash Functions from Lattices: Short Signatures and IBEs with Small Key Sizes
Jiang Zhang; Yu Chen; Zhenfeng Zhang
- State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, P.R. China; Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.R. China; Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.R. China
Breaking Symmetric Cryptosystems using Quantum Period Finding
Marc Kaplan; Gaëtan Leurent; Anthony Leverrier; María Naya-Plasencia
- Télécom ParisTech, France and University of Edinburgh, UK; Inria, France; Inria, France; Inria, France
注：可以看看，对对称密码来说可能是个坏消息，但是大家又有事可干了，未尝不好呢
we show that the most widely used modes of operation for authentication and authenticated
encryption (e.g. CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, and OCB)
are completely broken in this security model. Our attacks are also applicable
to many CAESAR candidates: CLOC, AEZ, COPA, OTR, POET,
OMD, and Minalpher. This is quite surprising compared to the situation
with encryption modes: Anand et al. show that standard modes are
secure with a quantum-secure PRF.
FHE Circuit Privacy Almost For Free
Florian Bourse; Rafael Del Pino; Michele Minelli; Hoeteck Wee
- ENS, Paris, France; ENS, Paris, France; ENS, Paris, France; ENS, Paris, France
注：不错的技巧，利用了G^(-1)函数的随机特性，保护了电路隐私，同时没有太影响效率。不过不知道这个假设是不是太强了，感觉G^(-1)对噪声分析来说随机性还可以，但是用来保证安全，需要进一步研究。
Circuit-ABE from LWE: Unbounded Attributes and Semi-Adaptive Security
Zvika Brakerski; Vinod Vaikuntanathan
- Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel; MIT, USA
注：可以看看ABE方面的进展，做到了semi-security
Circular Security Separation for Arbitrary Length Cycles from LWE
Venkata Koppula; Brent Waters
- University of Texas at Austin, USA; University of Texas at Austin, USA
Fully Secure Functional Encryption for Inner Products, from Standard Assumptions
Shweta Agrawal; Benoît Libert; Damien Stehlé
- IIT Delhi, India; ENS de Lyon, France; ENS de Lyon, France
Lattice-Based Fully Dynamic Multi-Key FHE with Short Ciphertexts
Zvika Brakerski; Renen Perlman
- Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel; Tel Aviv University, Israel